This study examines the signaling roles of political parties and political advertising. Although politicians' types are unobservable during an election, their party affiliations and political advertisements are observable to the voters. Through these two political behaviors, politicians can reveal their hidden types to the public. We extend Snyder and Ting [1] to a multi-period model with the possibility of reelection and examine the roles and relationships of political parties and advertisements. We show that political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians' types. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect their favored candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.
Introduction
For politicians in an election, joining political parties and creating political advertisements are important activities. First, many candidates belong to political parties, even if their own political standpoints seem different to some extent from the parties' political standpoints. Second, almost all political candidates make posters before elections. They sometimes spend enormous amounts of money on media advertising. Although voters observe these political advertisements, they often seem useless for the voters. Advertisements call out the candidates' names repeatedly, and do not inform the voters of any candidates' policy plannings. Then, these kinds of political parties and advertisements are often criticized as wastes of money. However, this study sheds light on the positive aspects of Because candidates' types are hidden and unknown to voters during an election, candidates send signals to differentiate themselves from other candidates.
Snyder and Ting [1] show that if politicians' types are uncertain to voters, parties function as brand names (signals) that ensure the politicians' types to some extent in the same manner Spence's [2] signaling model. Since belonging to a party implies that a politician's policy is close to the party's ideal policy, it conveys information about that politician's hidden type.
Given this role of political parties, what is the role of political advertisements?
If they also work as a signal, are they a substitute for or a complement of political parties? Related studies, like Alesina and Spear [3] and Harrington [4] , do not answer these questions clearly. This study extends Snyder and Ting [1] to a multi-period model with the possibility of reelection and answers these questions.
Political parties are not sufficient signals, and political advertisements serve as a complement to political parties.
Only a few studies [5] have analyzed reelection from theoretical point of view.
One particular characteristic about reelections is that, after one term in office, the hidden type of the incumbent is completely revealed to the voters. In a second election, this fact can be an advantage for some of the incumbents, whose hidden types have been found to be favorable (i.e., ex-post good) to the voters. Such incumbents can be reelected. However, this fact can be a disadvantage for other incumbents whose hidden types have been found to be less favorable than expected (i.e., ex-post bad) to the voters in reality. Such incumbents cannot be reelected. In short, there are two types of politicians. The first type (ex-post good) can win the election twice, and the other type (ex-post bad) can win the election only once. The problem is that, in the first election, both types belong to parties, and voters cannot distinguish between the two types. In other words, voters may choose an ex-post bad politician in the first election. Thus, parties are not sufficient signals. Then, there is a possibility that political advertisements also work as an additional signal, even if they do not convey any information about the politicians' hidden types to the voters, and hence, they are simply a waste of money in the sense of Milgrom and Roberts [6] In the first election, candidates who can be reelected and win office twice (ex-post good) have stronger incentives than candidates who can win office only once. In addition to joining parties, ex-post good politicians create political advertisements and spend money to reveal their hidden type. Then, voters can choose only ex-post good candidates in the first election.
In Section 2, we overview Snyder and Ting [1] The key feature of a reelection is that politicians completely reveal their types after one term in office. Although joining a party partially reveals a politician's type, conducting his ideal policy in his term of office is assumed to reveal his type. Because in Snyder and Ting [1] and in our model, politicians' types directly indicate their ideal policies, this assumption is natural.
Introducing Reelection to the Basic Model

Timing of the Model
There are three players in our model: candidates, political parties, and voters.
Although there are two parties, there are numerous candidates and voters. The timing of our model is described as follows, but, in short, our model adds a second period (second election) to the model of Snyder and Ting [1] . hidden types, they can observe whether or not the candidates belong to the parties. The winner of the election is determined by the plurality rule. The winner of the election holds the office and gains a payoff. After one term in office, a politician's type is completely revealed to both parties and voters.
d) In the next period, the incumbent decides whether to run for reelection.
The party also decides whether the incumbent will run for reelection or not. If the incumbent does not run for reelection, nature again selects a new candidate for that party. In addition, nature randomly selects one candidate who chooses to belong to the other party for the election.
e) In the second election, the winner is decided by plurality rule. The winner of the second election also holds the office and gains the same payoff as in the first election.
We should note that the decision to run for reelection is made by both the politician and the party to which he or she belongs. First, running for reelection must be profitable to the politician who now holds office. Second, the party must nominate a candidate for reelection who is more likely to win office than a newly nominated politician is. In other words, a politician runs for reelection only if the probability of his reelection is higher than that of a new candidate whose ideal policy is unknown to the public. 
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The Equilibrium
We deal with the case in which there are two political parties and both of them choose the platform 0
. This case is natural because the median voter is also at 0. In other words, both parties target the median voter, and they suggest the same policy.
First, we consider the behavior of politicians in each period. We use backward induction. In the second period, the incumbent who won the first period election has to compete against a candidate from the other party. We call this new candidate of the opponent party the "challenger". Then, the expected payoff of the median voter at 0 if the challenger is elected is ( ) 
Then, in the second election, for the incumbent to win, This is the equilibrium when 3 2 θ < in Snyder and Ting [1] . Related studies about this platform selection are Bernhardt and Ingberman [7] , Calvert [8] , Palfrey [9] , and Snyder [10] .
, the politician joins a party and gets reelected. We refer to such a politician as a "two-time winner". We find that a "loser" does not join a party. Therefore, we can say that joining a party works to signal a politician's type to some extent. We also find that one-time winners are found to be unfavorable to the voters after one term in office, even though they were elected in the first election.
Because each party selects one candidate, the first election has three possibili- Both of these politicians join parties, and one of them gets elected with 50% probability in the first election but does not get reelected.
• Two-Time Winner vs. One-Time Winner Both of these politicians join parties, one of them gets elected with 50% probability in the first election, and only the two-time winner can get reelected.
• Two-Time Winner vs. Two-Time Winner Both of these politicians join parties, and one of them gets elected with 50% probability in the first election and gets reelected.
As is shown above, joining a party works as a signal to some extent. However, there is still a problem with voting for the most favored candidate. If promising candidates (two-time winners) compete against non-promising candidates (onetime winners), promising candidates have only a 50% chance of winning. This fact implies that political parties are not sufficient signals.
The main result is as follows. Incumbents in a narrower range can run for reelection and win office. However, joining a political party does not differentiate between ex-post good politicians (who can get reelected) and ex-post bad politicians (who cannot get reelected). We can say that political parties do not work sufficiently for the voters to choose their favored candidates.
Introducing Reelection and Advertisements to the Basic Model
Timing of the Model
As seen in the previous section, political parties are not sufficient signals. The important point to note is that advertisements neither affect the payoffs of the voters nor convey any information except their quantity; therefore, political advertisements are simply a waste of money in the same sense as in Milgrom and Roberts [6] . However, the important point is that the amount of money spent on political advertisement becomes known to the public. This setting is natural because in reality political advertisements often call candidates' names repeatedly, convey any information about candidates' policy planning, and voters only know which candidate use more advertisements.
Promising candidates who can win office twice want to design political advertisements to send more signals to the public before the first election. This property is because, as seen in the previous section, in the first election, simply joining a party does not differentiate a two-time winner from a one-time winner, although it does differentiate a winner from a loser. To be more precise, in equilibrium, each candidate type can win the first election with 50% probability. However, if the candidate were known to voters as a two-time winner, he or she would win the election with 100% probability. Therefore, he or she has the incentive to reveal his or her hidden type by designing advertisements.
The Equilibrium
Whether or not candidates use political advertisements depends on the opponent's type and policy. We use the same definitions of a "loser", a "one-time winner", and a "two-time winner" as before; a candidate is called a loser if
, and a candidate is called a two-time winner if 3 3 ,
As before, a one-time winner cannot win reelection and a two-time winner can win reelection.
Because each party selects one candidate, the first vote has three possibilities: 
Why Are Advertisements Complementary?
In the previous section, we have found that both political parties and political advertisements work as signals to voters. In some cases candidates only use parties, and in other cases candidates use parties and advertisements. It seems that candidates' first priority is joining parties. In this section, we would like to explain why the priority is political parties, and why advertisements serve as complement to parties.
Basically, political parties work as more efficient signals than advertisements. This is because belonging to parties costs candidates heterogeneously, whereas creating advertisements costs candidates homogeneously. First, consider political parties. Candidates who are located further from the parties' ideal policies pay a larger cost to join the parties than do candidates who are located nearer to the parties' ideal policies. This fact is represented in (1 
Summary
Let us summarize the main points of this paper. Investigating a multi-period version of Snyder and Ting [1] , we study the signaling aspects of political parties and political advertisements. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties; political parties are basically more efficient signals than political advertisements are. However, candidates who have strong incentives to win and require more signals use advertisements in addition to joining parties.
We can conclude that both political parties and advertisements help voters to adequately choose ex-post good politicians in elections. Although political advertisements can be regarded as a social cost in a sense that they do not directly yield any utility or gain, they work as a signaling tool that conveys correct information about politicians' types.
There are limitations on this study. First, we analyze two-period version of Snyder and Ting [1] . It is possible for us to add more periods to the model. The results would change to some extent. Second, in our definition of political advertisements, they do not convey any information about the hidden types of the candidates. However, in reality, some advertisements are informative. We have to evaluate this kind of advertisements on a case-by-case basis. 
In option (C), candidate i joins a party and additionally uses advertisements.
Although joining a party serves to differentiate this candidate from unaffiliated candidates, advertisements work to differentiate this candidate from the other party-affiliated candidate. Therefore, the amount of advertisements is ) which is equal to the gain of candidate j, since candidate j cannot pay that amount of money even if he or she can win the election. Then, the voters can elect the better candidate even in the first election. For candidate i, option (C) provides a gain of ( ) ( )
